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8 April 1966

IMPROVED STRATEGIC PLANNING

By

L. DORSEY

Commander, United States Navy



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Improved Strategic Planning

by

Commander L. Dorsey, U. S. Navy

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
8 April 1966

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SUMMARY

In an increasingly interdependent world, exertion of U.S. power in the interests of international order and evolution has emphasized the multi-faceted nature of strategy--political, military, economic, etc.--and the need for optimum conceptual combination of these aspects on both a regional and global basis. Meanwhile, various revolutionary forces and influences are creating widespread international instability. It is the purpose of this thesis to analyze the difficulties of providing improved strategic planning needed for more orderly progress in human affairs. This analysis consists of an identification of important conceptual difficulties which stand in the way of improving strategic planning.

An examination of strategy and its aspects reveals knowledge deficiencies and ambiguities which impede clear perception needed in the formulation of most precise and meaningful national programs. Although the Communist ideology attempts to bypass these difficulties and maintains that the Communist course is superior, these efforts have proved to be unsound and illusory, raising new problems as communism pursues a global imperialist and wrecking operation through diverse twilight conflicts.

Despite military essentiality in contemporary world affairs, aversion to wars of the type of WW I and WW II has created emphasis on getting conflicts from the battlefield to the supposedly reasonable discussions of the conference table. Thus, attempts have been made in international organizations to use political, economic, social, and other instrumentalities to settle international conflicts although to do so may bring even greater uncertainties and complexities. The main bulwark in the U.S. efforts at international order is the fear inspired in aggressors by U.S. and Free World military ability to punish aggressors who would destroy order. The mainstay of order--the military means--is thereby less favored than the other more questionable instrumentalities. Thus, communism operates somewhat free of the punishment that it earns for upsetting order and progress. Such conceptual difficulties of managing and applying policy instrumentalities effectively were shown in this thesis.

This thesis concludes that it is necessary that U.S. national strategy continue in its present character, relying on the primary instrumentality of military force. The basis for this conclusion is practicality--that the present strategy utilizes the least uncertain means. However, refinements in knowledge, techniques, and methods must be continually developed to resolve traditional ambiguities--conceptual difficulties--in

optimum mix of strategic instruments. Such sustained effort is needed to continually clarify common international purposes and programs. These conceptual difficulties in developing strategies of order and progress in human affairs are traditional intellectual challenges to which Free World institutions (including the War Colleges of the United States) are being called on to contribute their increasingly vital intellectual efforts.

FOREWORD

Let there be therefore (and may it be for the benefit of both) two streams and two dispensations of knowledge . . . let there in short be one method for the cultivation, another for the invention, of knowledge . . .*

Francis Bacon, 1620.

He and only he knows the world. The world at any moment is merest appearance. . . . The scholar is that man who must take up into himself all the ability of the time, all the contributions of the past, all the hopes of the future. He must be a university of knowledges . . .**

Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1837.

Today, the university stands as a prime agency to which society assigns the task . . . of civilization itself. . . . Providing for society's self-regeneration calls upon the university to modify its traditional purposes. . . . While no one university can be all that is 'the university', it must be a significant part of that concept . . .***

Lloyd H. Elliot, 1966.

*Francis Bacon, "Preface to the Novum Organum" in Harvard Classics, Vol. 39, ed. by Charles W. Elliot, p. 146.

**Ralph Waldo Emerson, "The American Scholar" in Harvard Classics, Vol. 5, ed. by Charles W. Elliot, pp. 16, 22.

***Lloyd H. Elliot, "The George Washington University- Its Spirit and Purpose". The George Washington University Magazine, Vol. 2, Winter 1966, pp. 2-3.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

TO MOVE AHEAD

National strategy takes a long term view of world events. This being so, strategic guidance is more useful in developing national programs than subjective analyses of present day events. To the extent that strategy is clear and is consistent with past and present happenings, with forecasted trends,¹ and considers all major factors, it is a useful guide to future programs. For all nations encompassed by a strategy, that strategy must always show cognizance of predominant national views, dilemmas, postures, and potentials.

Strategy depends on quality and scope of component knowledge inputs. Thus, strategy formulation depends on what knowledge exists and what situational perceptions and concepts are formed with this knowledge. In this sense, perception, concepts, and strategy are related.²

War--and protracted conflict--is very complex today and is more difficult for one man (such as a Machiavelli or a Clauswitz)

¹Rudolph Schrader, "Scientific Approach to Military Problems," Military Review, Vol. 45, Jul. 1965, p. 38.

²Both Machiavelli and Clauswitz were "convinced that the validity of any special analysis of military problems depended on a general perception, on a correct concept of the nature of war." (Felix Gilbert, "Machiavelli" in The Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. by Edward M. Earle, p. 25.)

to form a comprehensive perception and general principles from which specific situations can be understood. This is one conceptual difficulty.

A well conceived strategy will be used not only in national program development but will be used to facilitate effective national utilization of instrumentalities--political, military, etc. Conceptual difficulties with one strategic instrumentality will affect the direction, relevance and efficacy of the entire strategy. Conceptual difficulties occur today in various aspects and at various levels of policy formulation and execution.

In today's rapidly changing and complex environment, the implementer and the operator require continuing strategic guidance as to magnitudes and course of events. In particular, the programmer and the military logistician must meet daily needs and must have precise magnitudes and dates to produce long range programs, especially for vital weapons systems which take several years to produce, to position, and for which to provide supporting infrastructure.

Unfortunately, the strategist finds the present controversial, knows the difficulty of predicting the future, and therefore, he does not wish to be pinned down to a single strategy. He is loathe to go beyond giving general indications of possible strategic direction, magnitude of short range operations, and broad timing guidelines.³

³Vincent J. Esposito as quoted by Benjamin H. Williams in The Economics of National Security, Volume XI, Requirements, ed. by Benjamin H. Williams, p. 33.

Yet, lacking clear guidance, the logistician may consider the unsatisfactory alternative of extrapolating his own; to do so would only add to his already difficult job, would be beyond his ken, and would cause improper resource use. Unless the strategist is pinned down, resources may be used ineffectively, producing ineffective results.

The current world struggle is in a larger sense one of competing managements. Communism produces an unbelievably large number of wide scope and continuing crises. Soviet Communists often seek to overwhelm from above and downward while Chinese Communists often seek to overwhelm at the grass roots level and upward. Some old and some new nations pursue a course that produces greater international turbulence in an increasingly turbulent world. To the extent that Free World strategy is an accurate reflection of actual conditions, then Free World philosophies and follow-on implementation doctrines may provide the framework for optimum concepts of management, a management which is hopefully more productive than competing ones.

It does not necessarily follow that superior strategic vision will invariably lead to an overall superior management. However, without a superior strategic vision, superior doctrine and management concepts are not possible. Hence, the problems of deriving a superior strategic vision are examined herein. The essential aspects of a superior corollary management which is also necessary is beyond the scope of this brief survey, although

in some cases a consideration of strategy must include an identification of strategic instrumentalities which must be managed.

Obtaining and applying knowledge is the key to improved strategic planning. Strategy seeks to shape human events and consequently draws from the entire range and depth of human knowledge. Occasionally, quality and content of knowledge fall short of what is needed. Just as the "state of the art" of science and technology momentarily curtails technological achievement, strategic planning relies on further development of knowledge. Unlike many "either-or" uncertainties⁴ in scientific knowledge, human events can tend to be the source of more misunderstandings.

It is unreasonable to expect that knowledge can be made complete and that all human events can be preplanned. One need look no further than the failure of the centrally planned Communist economies to realize this. The success of the American economic system derives from countless free choices and decisions of the marketplace, moderated overall by macro-economic⁵ procedures which recently evolved to their high state of effectiveness. This evolvment derives from improved macro-economic knowledge. Economics need no longer be called "the dismal science".

⁴Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, pp. 182-204.

⁵Thomas F. Dernburg and Duncan M. McDougall, Macro-Economics, pp. 1-2.

Strategy must similarly evolve, as did macro-economics, working amid the world institutions.⁶ Such a strategic development will rely on an evolvement of knowledge, some of which is faulty at present as outlined herein.

As knowledge of our own and contemporary environments develops, it must be applied so as to continue to furnish a strategy embodying: ". . . the most intelligent guide lines to action in keeping with those great tides of human affairs that are beyond the immediate ken and control of the nations of the world."⁷

THE MILITARY LESSON

The study of past wars can be a rich source of wisdom and knowledge--revealing climactic political and social occurrences which help explain the present and hint at the future. This is why so many pages of histories contain the prelude and aftermath of wars.

World War I changed forever the course of countless lives and altered forever the courses of many nations. Some nations and empires vanished. Although treaties and intense French and German military planning preceded the war, it came through an unlikely sequence of Balkan triggered events.⁸ And yet, few would have predicted its coming. One writer likens western society's unpredicted entry into the war to the sinking of the

⁶ Ian L. M. McGeoch, "A British View, National Security and Grand Strategy," Military Review, Vol. 45, Aug. 1965, p. 11.

⁷ Halford L. Hoskins, "The U.S. in the Middle East: Policy in Transition," Current History, Vol. 48, May 1965, p. 262.

⁸ Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August, p. 91.

Titanic two years earlier: the triumphant new ship that could not sink unpredictably struck the hidden ice and went under.⁹ Western society, too, was swept unpredictably into the maelstrom although Norman Angel's book of 1910, The Great Illusion,¹⁰ may have predicted this Great War.

Post WW I events contained the seeds of WW II, that war that Churchill said¹¹ could have been easily prevented, that war which others knew to be coming.¹² The traumatic events of both WW I and WW II and current complexity of events cause an aversion¹³ to military actions despite military essentiality.

Yet, today, the Communist world is insecure until its global empire is realized; but it is also confident of central planning (which will not work at home). In this state of mind communism is busily buying time with many covert wrecking operations, murders, aggressions, and crises abroad. While it does this it is deceptively diverting everyone by constantly filling their heads with many dark fears, illusions and alarms--a trick also

⁹Gerhard Masur, The Prophets of Yesterday, pp. 1-2.

¹⁰Norman Angel, The Great Illusion, p. 267: "I have . . . again and again stated . . . that war was extremely likely, indeed inevitable, so long as the political ideas that the book attacks were dominate in international affairs."

¹¹Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 17.

¹²Elizabeth R. Cameron, "Fighters for Lost Causes: Alexis Saint-Leger Leger" (p. 390) and Richard D. Challener, "The Old Tradition in a New Era: The French Foreign Office: The Era of Philippe Berthelot" (pp. 83-85), both in The Diplomats 1919-1939, ed. by Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert.

¹³John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since WW II, p. v., and Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience, pp. xviii-xxii.

used in the 1920's by Stalin on the Russian people.¹⁴ The unique Communist ideology is such that it is unable to recognize any logic other than resolute force. Hence, the value to the Free World's survival of military force as one component of the resolute strategic forces exerted toward global law and order.

Existence of credible military means gives any aggressor pause. Survival of civilization and eventual creation of a fully sound world of law, depend on wise use of military force in an increasingly interdependent world. The record of post WWII U.S. military operations demonstrates this.¹⁵

(The) point is clear that states freed from the inhibiting fear of military punishment, may cast off the restraints of international law and morality, thus undermining the foundations of international order--and ultimately producing a violent explosion by victims of their behavior.¹⁶

The Free World concern with the military instrumentality is, thus, not as a means of making war, nor is order its objective per se. Rather, the military instrumentality is: ". . . a means of gaining time during which economic and political efforts may help create situations out of which lasting peace may emerge."¹⁷ The strategy which uses the military instrumentality in this

¹⁴Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, pp. 109, 115.

¹⁵Leilyn M. Young, "Win, Its Meaning in Crisis Resolution," Military Review, Vol. 46, Jan. 1966, p. 30-39.

¹⁶Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares, p. 466.

¹⁷Duncan S. Ballantine and others, "Strategy of Defense," The New York Times, 30 Apr. 1950, p. 8E.

manner must also use, resolutely, the other instrumentalities in combination or alternatively in bringing order and in creating or sustaining those situations "out of which lasting peace may emerge."¹⁸

ILLUSION IMPEDES ACTION

Illusions, however, exist which sometimes would seemingly make such resolute action irrelevant or needless. Better knowledge or understanding is needed to combat illusion.

In 1965 the 20th anniversary of the UN was declared International Cooperation Year. For this cooperation, understanding is recognized as a basic requirement.¹⁹ The need for understanding is formidable challenge.

The strategist requires wide understanding yet he faces an ambiguous world where misunderstandings abound. Most people who are experienced in this field realize this.²⁰ The strategist must learn to deal with both the real and the apparent. Similarly, when the basic characteristic of our time is increasing world interdependence, the U.S. and her allies must learn how to cope with illogical national policies that threaten their security.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹To Accomplish These Aims, *Passim*.

²⁰Paul H. Nitze, "United States Global Strategy," Naval War College Review, Vol. 18, Sep. 1965, p. 17.

STRATEGIC TASK

Strategy is a guide to accomplishment.²¹ This includes successful maintenance of an existing situation or the achievement of a more favorable situation within the context of various, scarce or plentiful resources. This being so, accurate definition is needed of either the existing or desired situation, forces which affect the situation if nothing is done, and finally, both the scarce and plentiful resources which can be utilized. Consequently, strategic complexity and ambiguity must be minimized or resolved if clearest planning guidance is to be produced which avoids counterproductive or irrelevant actions.

Since there is such a need for clear strategic guidance, this thesis identifies difficulties in thinking--conceptual difficulties--which can obscure guidance. By regarding these pitfalls in thinking it becomes easier to avoid them, ultimately to bridge the gaps that they can cause, and continually to state practical global and regional strategies.

It has already been shown that military power has been troublesome to civilization; yet this fact should not obscure civilization's continuing need for a militarily strong Free World. Also, it was observed that in human affairs there is some element of chance.^{22,23} This observation serves to

²¹Bernard L. Austin, "Military Considerations of Grand Strategy," Naval War College Review, Special June 1963 edition, p. 1-14.

²²Hoskins, op. cit.

²³Masur, op. cit.

introduce the difficulty (shown in the next chapter) of obtaining and using knowledge to shape human actions. Historic Russian and British cases are used to show the critical and lasting international effect of illusions obstructing both knowledge of events and in providing practical actions. The importance to international affairs of abstract and theoretical knowledge is noted, also.

Subsequent chapters identify other conceptual difficulties. The importance of the military policy instrument is highlighted in view of some trends to avoid this instrument in favor of other policy instruments which have been less fully perfected. Note is taken of future strategies needed to maintain order. These strategies are viewed in perspective with education which has traditionally had the task of resolving conceptual difficulties and preserving civilization.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC APPRAISAL AND ACTION

ACTION CONCEPT

Of all the questions raised by the great crises and wars of our times, none is more insistent than the query, "What is to be done?"

Despite the question of what purposeful action is needed, there is some question that clear, objective actions can be produced.

The strategist, Liddell Hart, for one, raises such a question after a lifetime devoted to the study of wars, including the strategic lessons of the wars of 25 centuries: ". . . I tended to assume that people could learn to think objectively about history and war; now I just accept that few people can reason objectively about anything. . . .I see the absurdities of life more than I did."¹

The historian, McNeil, concludes his monumental global history, The Rise of the West, with: "The fact that even the best laid plans for directing human affairs still often fail may turn out to be humanity's saving grace."²

¹Basil H. Liddell Hart, "Thoughts on War," Military Review, Vol. 45, Sep. 1965, p. 32.

²William H. McNeil, The Rise of the West, p. 804.

Nevertheless, many people hold the view that clear objective actions have been produced in the past. Some examples might be the prolonged global exercise of British military and sea power, the constitutional development of the United States, or even the cynical creation of Soviet Russia.

Russia is a case in point. In 1903-1904 the Russian, Professor Miliukov of the University of Moscow, delivered a series of lectures at the Lowell Institute in Boston and at the University of Chicago, outlining needed Russian reforms.³ In 1917 Miliukov was Russia's Foreign Minister and, but for his illusions as to Russia's extremis need for helpful action, he probably could have been the key to averting the final Russian crisis which came later in the year.⁴

APPRAISAL CONCEPT

If purposeful and timely action is to be taken in any situation, an accurate appraisal of that situation is therefore needed. This is the case today. Whatever the actions, all will have a central purpose to preserve the freedom of the United States of America and to build an orderly community of evolving

³Paul Miliukov, Russia and Its Crisis, pp. 13, 18, 166.

⁴Fainsod, op. cit., p. 85. (Fainsod contends that military failure, widespread personal hardships, and unrest in 1917 made it vital that Russia withdraw from WW I and institute land reforms. Miliukov's illusions prevented him from doing this, according to Fainsod. Lenin of course did withdraw Russia from the War and appeared to institute land reforms. However, the Russian crisis was cynically used by Lenin and Stalin to enslave the Russian people rather than to respond to their legitimate desires.)

nations wherein individual freedom, responsibility, and development is emphasized. Rationality and order have always been the past prerequisites to civilization's stable evolution.

This does not answer the question of what actions are to be taken; this merely defines the character of needed future actions. The great crises and wars of our times insistently continue to demand specific actions. The great purpose of strategy is to shape and to facilitate these actions.

What one sees and understands will determine what one does next. Knowledge is a key to understanding what one sees as the following example illustrates. Objects may be seen, but to understand them and their relation, one must also rely on knowledge. This is the case of the ship captain or aircraft commander entering a strange seaport or airport area at night: he sees much but he must check instruments and charts and perhaps even recall details of briefings and publications to understand what he sees. His understanding determines what he does next.⁵

Knowledge is also a prerequisite to strategic action. Current strategic appraisals and crises cause more frequent and thorough searches of human knowledge than ever before.

⁵US Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Psychological Aspects of the Global Conflict, Chap. 2, "Not a Dogma But a Guide to Action," by Warren B. Walsh, p. 27.

CONCEPT OF THE PRESENT WORLD

What does one see on viewing present day events? One sees great complexity. Important issues are often seen as inter-related evolutions of the following types:

Economic. New fiscal, monetary, production, and trade techniques facilitate uninterrupted economic growth of some nations. But this growth is accompanied by social change.⁶

Cultural. New patterns of living are born from rising economic affluence and scientific rationalism.

Scientific and Technical. The impact of each new major invention is vast and is felt everywhere. Sudden inventions such as the atom bomb can radically alter the balance of power of nations. Technology changes individualism,⁷ alters sovereignty,⁸ substitutes standardization for spontaneity, "know how" for "know why" and provides domination of means, over ends.⁹

Political. A rise of nationalism, internationalism, and totalitarianism.

Social. An accelerating increase in world population.

⁶Laurens Dorsey, The Objective of Rapid Economic Growth, pp. 8, 13-16.

⁷Dave Smith, "Saving Man From Technology Gives 30 of Top Thinkers Another Think," Washington Post, 21 Dec. 1965, p. A4. Laurens Dorsey, Challenge for Command, pp. ii-xi.

⁸Howard Simons, "US Brains Widen an Atlantic Gap," Washington Post, 26 Dec. 1965, p. E1. Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 15.

⁹Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, pp. 3-21.

CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE

Despite an "age of computers," a survey of human knowledge would reveal that it is not a deep reservoir of homogeneous data readily available for application. As in every age, there are frontiers to existing knowledge. There are also knowledge gaps within academic disciplines (knowledge categories). And a lack of communication between disciplines curtails general knowledge development and application. Historical knowledge is sometimes ambiguous, providing an ambiguous guide to the present and to the future. Also, at a time of increasing interdependence among nations, these nations (and societies within these nations) perceive the same events quite differently. These differences are profound.¹⁰ And within societies even the experts sometimes disagree.¹¹ Knowledge defects in economics or sociology can affect the strategies of all instrumentalities (including the military). Current actions must, however, be based on current knowledge. Illusion becomes a factor to be considered, too:

. . . Many illusions are perfectly normal and can be experienced by a large number of people at the same time . . . The normality and indeed the inevitableness of so many illusions constitute one of the serious problems of any attempt to vindicate the validity of human knowledge.¹²

¹⁰Irving Hallowell, "Culture, Personality and Society" in Anthropology Today, ed. by Sol Tax, pp. 362-363.

¹¹Henry M. Jackson, "Executives, Experts, and National Security" in Conduct of National Security Policy Selected Readings. US Congress. Senate. Committee on Government operations, p. 77.

¹²"Illusion," Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 12, p. 102.

Knowledge can be a step toward minimizing illusion. However, ". . . 'reality' for the individual is, to a high degree, determined by what is socially accepted as reality." Hence, socio-culture groups may be the source of illusions and preconceived or even false ideas.¹³

Totalitarian leaders cannot tolerate the action uncertainty that the question of illusion versus reality offers; seeking to be "iron engines of history," they also seek a clear track ahead and therefore try to eliminate illusion entirely. Unfortunately for them and for the rest of the world, more terrible illusions are created.

Nowadays, there are many examples of news media items which purport to disclose the "reality of the situation" compared to what is considered the "illusion" or myth of the current policy, issue, or action.¹⁴ For 20 years the press "reveals" the death of the UN in each crisis; yet the UN still lives. One writer and lecturer stresses that ". . . we have to cut through a great wad of illusions."¹⁵ Another says "nothing is more important for

¹³Kurt Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts, pp. 57-62.

¹⁴Steward Alsop, "The Twin Illusions," Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 238, 23 Oct. 1965, p. 18. Steward Alsop, "What the People Really Think," Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 238, 23 Oct. 1965, p. 27. Henry A. Kissinger, "The Illusionist--Why We Misread de Gaulle," Harpers, Vol. 230, Mar. 1965, pp. 69-77. Felix Greene, A Curtain of Ignorance, p. xvi. "Does China Live by Illusions?" Current, No. 62, Aug. 1965, p. 21.

¹⁵Bernard B. Fall, Counterinsurgency: The French Experience, p. 21.

America than to give up its illusions . . . to build our own reality is perhaps our ultimate challenge."¹⁶

Considering ". . . uncertain boundaries between illusion and reality"¹⁷ has lead to highly practical conclusions and successful actions. Examples are President Kennedy's national economic program¹⁸ and one successful American businessman's cautious economic creed.¹⁹ Indeed, it is essential to consider myths, uncertainties, and illusions, in order to better identify the actuality.²⁰

Generally, though, "practical men of action don't like to be bothered by theories"²¹ (such as theories on illusions); they may regard such matters "as uncongenial and unnecessary."²² Yet one practical man, Winston Churchill, was stunned at the unreal actions of the British in the '30's when the British lost air parity.²³ According to one young Harvard student,²⁴ the responsible elements of Britain were mired in a state of unreal views or illusion. Gilbert Highet identifies the episode very simply with the British government in the '30's: ". . . The worst

¹⁶Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, pp. 7, 357.

¹⁷"Books: Current and Various," Time, Vol. 86, 6 Aug. 1965, p. 90.

¹⁸Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "A Thousand Days--XV; The JFK Battle vs Economic Myths," Washington Post, 30 Jan. 1966, p. A22.

¹⁹"A Simon Sampler," Time, Vol. 85, 4 Jun. 1965, p. 78.

²⁰Hitch and McKean, op. cit., p. 193.

²¹US Industrial College of the Armed Forces, op. cit., p. 21.

²²Ibid.

²³Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, pp. 110-129.

²⁴John F. Kennedy, Why England Slept, pp. 3-8, 22-23.

speaker I ever heard in my life was the late Stanley Baldwin . . .
(example. . . .Half an hour of this put his audience to sleep.
Several years of it put Britain to sleep."²⁵

It is not the view here that America is duplicating this seemingly simple British malady of the 1930's. But one does wonder at a possible duplication of this malady by some of the Free World nations in reaching parity with the Communists in the twilight or revolutionary war. Indeed, there is much to divert nations from this threat, as Britain was diverted from air parity.

Those who confuse the distant future with the present are said to share a dream or to have illusions, also. For example it is said, some UN advocates in their work for peace confuse the distant dream on universality with a far different present day. Sometimes the same mistake is made by advocates of some types of future warfare.²⁶

Illusions are rare with material objects but not unknown. However, illusions are less rare in dealing with concepts. And concepts are much the substance of international affairs.

Of the three categories of human intelligence, the foundation of human knowledge is most firm on the first two:

- ability to deal with things--mechanical intelligence
- ability to deal with people--social intelligence

²⁵Gilbert Highet, The Art of Teaching, p. 103.

²⁶Cyril Falls, One Hundred Years of War, pp. 337, 344, and 454-455.

--ability to deal with ideas--conceptual intelligence (e.g., concepts, numbers, symbols, abstract formulations, ideologies)"²⁷

The practical or pragmatic abilities of dealing with things and people--ideas about things and about people--come easier to Americans than ideas about concepts, about abstracts,²⁸ etc.

Alexis de Tocqueville observed this in 1832 at the conclusion of his American visit.²⁹ The American custom has been one of making practical application of the abstract theories derived in Europe or elsewhere.³⁰ America's present reliance on Lord Keynes' economic theories is one current example.³¹

Today, however, Europe is now dependent to some extent on American theory--technology R & D.³² The Communist custom is practical application of false, abstract theories to trap and enslave all peoples!

CIVILIAN VS MILITARY STRATEGY

In an era of complexity, despite illusion and despite knowledge gaps, guidelines for present and future national programs must be formed by strategists.

²⁷OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men, p. 272.

²⁸Leland Stowe, "They Shall Not Sleep," Familiar Quotations, p. 984.

²⁹Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, pp. 143, 164.

³⁰Vannevar Bush, Science, The Endless Frontier, p. 14.

³¹"U.S. Business in 1965," Time, Vol. 86, 31 Dec. 1965, pp. 64-67B. Gunnar Myrdal, Challenge to Affluences, p. 86.

³²Simons, op. cit., p. E1.

It is not always clear as to what degree comprehensive considerations of national strategy are within military or civilian professional competency.³³ It is not the purpose of this thesis to debate this question. Military professionals have, however, made past contributions to national strategy as the following example indicates:

In 1949 the House Committee on the Armed Services noted that the JCS had made their own list of national objectives in absence of any guides from their civilian superiors . . . these objectives are extremely fundamental to national defense planning; they have a profound effect on the nature of the grand strategy adopted by the United States.³⁴

The military man who attempts to implement national strategy with a military program must have an intimate knowledge of that strategy. The intimacy must be such that where the strategy is very generalized or even silent on some points, the entire military program must include an accurate, extrapolated application of existing strategic guidance. The military programs emanating from national strategic guidance must provide military actions which are organically, almost inextricably, a part of the strategic whole. Consideration of military programs and actions is to a large extent, therefore, consideration of national strategic actions. Thus, the genesis of military actions is

³³Robert N. Ginsburgh, "The Challenge to Military Professionalism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, Nov. 1964, pp. 255-268, and Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 262-267, 463-466.

³⁴US Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. A Compilation of Material Relating to United States Defense Policies in 1962, p. 6, f. 3.

embodied in the national strategic questions of "what is to be done." Due to procurement lead times of several years, this question must be answered many years in advance.³⁵ Such answers can only come from an even longer view ahead.

³⁵The magnitude of the lead time problem is shown graphically in Herman Kahn's On Thermonuclear War, p. 317, fig. 5.

CHAPTER 3

POLICY INSTRUMENTALITIES AND MILITARY AMBIGUITY

POLICY ORIGIN

Today, with extensive worldwide US military deployments, striking forces and infrastructure, US policy seeks restrained use of this military instrumentality to preserve international order while facilitating evolutionary political, economic and social change and development of many emerging nations. On the other hand, communism deceptively identifies itself with these changes taking place and uses both subtle and crude wrecking techniques such as long term, widespread international murder of many millions of people including national and village leaders and use of other massive chaos. Such Communist activity in numerous global places is adverse to preserving international order. This veiled Communist aggressive activity is socio-political and not of the type that conventional US military means can quickly stamp out.¹ Neither can international organs such as the United Nations stop this aggression with military force. These organs are geared more to the idea of reacting when aggressive armies violate frontiers as were the classic cases of Nazi, Fascist and Japanese forces prior to WW II. But even so, when

¹Slavko N. Bjelajac, "Principles of Counterinsurgency," Orbis, Vol. 8, Fall 1964, p. 663.

military action does flare up the whole purpose of international peacekeeping machinery is to get the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. It is difficult for the military instrumentality to punish aggressors as needed to preserve international order.

The Communist policy, like the twilight wars that it fosters, does originate of course in the veiled, top-level governmental apparatus at Moscow and Peking. But extensive local apparatus such as at Hanoi and within the Viet Cong invaders is a practical chaos producing agent. This global chaos production de-stabilizes international order and focuses many, many insistent problems on the United States.

US foreign policy is developed by the chief executive of the nation. He patterns (by strategic decisions of a legislative type) policy instrumentalities to situations according to a grand, overall design. Predecision debate and conflict among competing US government departments and agencies (and foreign interests) leads to consensus, public approval, and action.² The chief and primary source of US policy formulation is the Secretary of State³ who works closely with the Secretary of Defense, ambassadors, country teams and other US agencies, and foreign states.

²Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense, pp. 174-175.

³Henry M. Jackson, ed., The National Security Council, p. 27.

The policy instrumentalities are described in some detail in various contemporary writings (see footnote below which identifies some of these writings).⁴ These instrumentalities are also considered in the following pages.

POLICY INSTRUMENTALITIES

At a time when progress in physical sciences and consequent military power development is accelerating, the current global conflict is being waged by means that are often more non-military than military. Of course, there have been more than 40 wars since WW II ended, yet foreign policies seek to employ many long-term means as well as shorter term military means in dealing with the day to day conflicts. This is a fact of life.

Something of this sort was urged by Harvard Professor William James in his 1907 lecture "The Moral Equivalent of War."⁵ Although Machiavelli's famed statecraft or non-military means evolved from a situation wherein the military system of the

⁴Politico-Military: Hans J. Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice" in Alliance Policy in the Cold War, ed. by Arnold O. Wolfers, pp. 184-212; and "South East Asia Treaty Organization," SEATO: Report 1963-1964, Tenth Annual Report. Economic: Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, "The Economic Instruments of Foreign Policy" in The Dynamics of International Politics, pp. 402-431. Psychological: Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van der Velde, "The Psychological Instrument of Statecraft" in Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy, pp. 3-22; and "Forum," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 19, Nov. 1963, pp. 29-38.

⁵William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War" in Pragmatism and Other Essays, pp. 295-301.

people was fatally defective (a situation wherein Machiavelli had decisively failed in his efforts to strengthen the existing military system)⁶ he also stressed the need for military force to facilitate political solutions.

The current non-military means take origin from the social sciences which are embryonic. On these embryonic foundations will hinge the ultimate cold war outcome unless military force is applied decisively. Application of military force may accelerate solution of politico-socio-economic problems.⁷ Still, the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China seems to show that "diplomacy has rarely been able to gain at the conference table what cannot be gained or held on the battlefield."⁸ The Communists do gain time at the conference table from the disorder, disunity and illusions they create there.

MIX OF INSTRUMENTALITIES

To transform military conflicts into political conflicts is one goal of the proliferated international organizations. This is a factor in there being a new interchangeability and blurring of the various traditional elements of national power and

⁶Thomas B. Macaulay, "Machiavelli" in Harvard Classics, Vol. 27, ed. by Charles W. Elliot, pp. 391-395.

⁷Curtis Jordon, "Viet Commerce Mushrooms With US Know-How, Money," Navy Times, 5 Jan. 1966, p. 9.

⁸Bedel Smith as quoted by Chalmers M. Roberts, "Ho Steals US Thunder," The Washington Post, 9 Jan. 1966, p. E1.

strategy. Raymond Garthoff gives the example of Soviet military power in Cuba that was not used in battle but still was used for political purposes.⁹ Robert Osgood says that the character and location of military forces have primary political and psychological functions and that economic as well as military policies are becoming highly diversified political instruments.¹⁰ The seeming blurring in Vietnam of the economic, social, political and military aspects is aptly noted throughout Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities.¹¹

MILITARY INSTRUMENTALITY

In viewing the various elements of strategy, Admiral Austin finds it vital to begin with the observation that philosophy is a clarification of terms. In this clarification he draws from the writings of the ancient Chinese, from Livy and from Clausewitz, as well as from the dictionaries of Webster and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He says this clarification is greatly important since, "Terms shape strategy (and) . . . strategy shapes our national destiny."¹² His most important point is that in today's sophisticated synthesis of the more diverse elements of strategy there is real danger that the military element is consciously or

⁹Raymond L. Garthoff, Military Power and Soviet Policy, pp. 15-17.

¹⁰Robert E. Osgood, NATO The Entangling Alliance, p. 5.

¹¹Charles Wolfe, Jr., Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities, passim.

¹²Bernard L. Austin, "Military Considerations of Grand Strategy," Naval War College Review, Special June 1963 edition, pp. 1-14.

unconsciously downgraded. He shows that it is a mistake to develop a strategy that provides for all courses of action except the final clear readiness and means to compel the adversary's submission by military force.¹³

The United States does possess these means and is constantly demonstrating the will and readiness of these means for decisive use. This has been true of past cold war events. The oversea military infrastructure contributes not only to the winning of cold war military conflict but to economic and social development during and after conflict.¹⁴

One doubts whether the Communist Revolutionary Warfare adventurism can ever be so reckless as to precipitate, conciously, a suicidal nuclear war. But the Communists have unquestionably shown that should the opportunity present itself, they will consciously use whatever means that they believe will assure them victory. These means include nuclear weapons.

Systematic extermination of millions of Russian and Chinese (mega-murder), the murder of all of Poland's intellectual leaders, and the patient programmed murder of all of the leaders of the Republic of Vietnam--these are the means of the Communists.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Jordan, op. cit.

A Soviet plan to use nuclear weapons is outlined in a book by the Soviet Marshall Sokolovsky. This strategic book may in itself be deceptive since, while purporting to provide comprehensive strategy, it gives scant mention of revolutionary warfare.¹⁵

¹⁵Vasilii D. Sokolovsky, Soviet Military Strategy, pp. 281-289.

CHAPTER 4

FUTURE STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

PREPARATION THROUGH APPRAISAL

One must look to the future and prepare for it despite the observations that at the beginning of each decade of this century, no one could have predicted what each decade would look like at its end.¹ And at the start of 1917, Lenin in Switzerland seemed convinced that the Russian Revolution would not occur in his lifetime.²

Such preparation should provide steady guidance to national programs of such a type as to find some middle ground between the 1957 view that the military were overwhelming themselves with new weapons systems³ and the 1965 view that weapons system development now appears overwhelmed by over control.⁴

CONCEPT OF THE FUTURE

Herman Kahn fears possible decisive scientific and technological breakthroughs as well as nuclear war, and he darkly views the future. He sees a successive escalation of international

¹Henry A. Kissinger, "The Illusionist--Why We Misread de Gaulle," Harpers, Vol. 230, Mar. 1965, pp. 69-77.

²Milovan Djilas, The New Class, pp. 32-33.

³Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 403.

⁴Hanson W. Baldwin, "Slow Down at the Pentagon," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, Jan. 1965, p. 262-280.

affairs into increasing instability unless rationality is imposed through knowledge:

Studies of these hypothetical future prospects are absolutely basic to an understanding of the arms race as well as to formulating sound measures for defense and arms control. Moreover, they should be designed to provide effective interplay of disciplines in the fields of politics, economics, law, psychology and anthropology as well as military science. Without these broad gauge probes into future possibilities, it is almost inevitable that our measures will be fitted to the last decade rather than the next.⁵

Kissinger's view of the future is also somber when he observes:

. . . a good will which does not necessarily produce understanding for dilemmas of other societies. . . . Whether (the future) America remains relevant to the rest of the world depends on the solution--perhaps even the recognition--of this problem.⁶

Future interdependent generations will face major dilemmas "of other societies" described below by Nair and Ramazani:

. . . certain (India) communities . . . and they probably are the majority, who in spite of the efforts . . . and the inducements seem inert and indifferent. They pass up repeated opportunities to increase production and income even when opportunity knocks at the door.⁷

We hope that socio-economic development with our assistance will in the distant future provide conditions more favorable to more stable political systems. . . . (Yet) our assistance programs accelerate the tempo of change . . . and increase demands on existing regimes which they are not always capable of meeting.⁸

⁵Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable, p. 230.

⁶Henry A. Kissinger, "Good Will and Beyond," The Washington Post Book Week, 17 Oct. 1965, p. 2.

⁷Kusum Nair, Blossoms in the Dust, p. 195.

⁸Rauhollah K. Ramazani, "The Changing United States Policy in the Middle East," Virginia Quarterly Review, Vol. 40, Summer 1964, p. 382.

Future generations must prepare for the impact of the eventual resolution of the internal dilemmas of Communist societies which now claim one third of mankind:

. . . Although the Communist revolution may start with the most idealistic concepts calling for wonderful heroism and gigantic effort, it gives the greatest and most permanent illusions. . . .The fact is simply this: they were unable to accomplish that in which they so fanatically believed. They cannot acknowledge this . . . anything of the sort is impossible for them.⁹

Jacques Ellul sees mankind of the twenty-first century entering into a perplexing "golden age"--perplexing because he sees it in the power of scientific "sorcerers . . . blind to the meaning of the human adventure."¹⁰ A future new "Dark Age" is, however, the conclusion made by a group of Nobel Prize-winning scientists; they are concerned with what they find a prevalent but weak hope that science will find a way. They are concerned that science advances without regard to consequence.¹¹

Walt Rostow has indicated that within approximately 60 years, the current eight economically mature nations will be joined by at least six more: Australia, Turkey, Argentina, Mexico, Communist China, and India. He feels that each of the six on reaching maturity will make critical decisions as the eight did previously on a balance between one of three following alternative courses: pursuit of power, welfare state, or accelerated mass consumption.

⁹Djilas, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-32.

¹⁰Jacques Ellul, *The Technological Society*, p. 435.

¹¹Jean M. White, "Scientists Say Births Portend Dark Age," *Washington Post*, 20 Jan. 1966, p. A5.

Finally,

. . . if our minds are cleared of the illusory notion that total power has somehow passed from Western Europe to Moscow and Washington; if we look at the world as it is and as it is becoming; if we look at its possibilities as well as its dangers, it becomes clear that we are trying to create and organize a world of middling powers, who foreseeably, will share all the tricks of modern technology.¹²

For the Honorable Paul Nitze a continued maritime role is an essential to the United States:

The seas will persist not only as the main channel by which substance is transferred in great quantity from continent to continent. They will grow in (importance) as sources of wealth . . . The emerging nations, in many cases, do not seem to appreciate the value of the freedom of the seas . . . a right which the United States (and its allies are) clearly constrained to assert and uphold . . . (Also) with respect to deterrence . . . POLARIS . . . plying the waters will be a mainstay against attack and intimidation for us and our allies for an undefinable future.¹³

There are also the sea functions of deploying and bringing force to bear in hostile land areas as well as sustaining distant military forces and friendly populations.¹⁴

The Communist Chinese display optimism. In their magnificently isolated view from Peking they are not chagrined at their own weakness and the utter folly of their doctrine. Neither are they disturbed at the need for better development data of an economic

¹²W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, pp. xii, 60, 73-74, 138.

¹³Paul H. Nitze, "Trends in the Use of the Sea and Their Implications on Foreign Policy," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 49, Mar. 1965, pp. 22-28.

¹⁴Paul H. Nitze, "Sealift Capabilities," Army and Joint Planning Capabilities, Carlisle Barracks: USAWC, 1965, p. 51.

or social nature since their external task is mainly to wreck and capture--not really to build. They say they view the future with confidence since they say their method of thought clings closest to Marxism and is therefore superior. They seemingly foresee victory:

(Our) enemies are idealists . . . unable to analyze the objective situation and proceed from reality . . . they judge the situation subjectively and thus make light of their opponents . . . They always look at problems from a one sided point of view and cannot handle correctly the various relations they encounter in military activities.¹⁵

¹⁵Tso-Peng Li, "Strategically Pitting One Against Ten, Tactically Pitting Ten Against One," Peking Review, Vol. 8, 16 Apr. 1965, pp. 26-27.

CHAPTER 5

PRACTICAL GLOBAL AND REGIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

US GLOBAL STRATEGY

Gazing into the distant future--past the year 1986, past the year 2066, even farther--the Free World sometimes ponders the journey ahead. Some nations debate with the United States--most powerful of nations--as to what strategy will best guide this advance.

Past strategies have shaped the destinies of the US and of other nations. For Britain the strategy once was: Antwerp "shall not fall" nor shall the keys to the sea lanes be wrested away--Gibraltar, Aden, Jamaica, the Bermudas, etc. Frederick List,¹ Alfred Mahan² and others spelled out some implications of strategic land and sea communications which shaped programs, wars and destinies of nations for many decades.

The spirit and elements of the US strategy are found in the UN Charter (to which the US became a signatory) as well as in documents, treaties and public utterances since 1945 and as summarized herein. The elements of this explanation define the

¹Edward M. Earle, "Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Frederick List: The Economic Foundations of Military Power," The Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. by Edward M. Earle, pp. 146, 148-154.

²Carroll S. Alden and Ralph Earle, Makers of Naval Tradition, pp. 228, 242-245. Margaret T. Sprout, "Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power," The Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. by Edward M. Earle, pp. 415-445.

nature of efforts needed to insure the very existence of the US, and it is therefore clear that the US will continue these efforts.

Since WW II; the United States has shown a deep and undying resolve³ in the task of helping allies to develop a better world. This has been done through treaty, through expenditure of treasure, and through great, continuing deployments of manpower (sometimes in armed combat). This great task is founded on the aim of orderly development of viable nations and regions of the world. It will continue. Yet the very success of the US efforts to strengthen nations has created divergences of strategic vision among nations which were thus successfully strengthened.

Unfortunately, "Willingness--or unwillingness--to take a fair share of the burden has become the crux of the Western defense problem"⁴ not only in the North Atlantic Community but even more significantly within civilization in all parts of the globe.

Through an entire global strategy of deception and massive murder of humans and of human reason, the Communists wreck and delay, confident that their doctrine will prevail. Yet where it has prevailed, betterment has not followed. Communism thus capitalizes strategically and organizationally on some of the most difficult aspects of world development tasks. Southeast Asia is the test case today though the test also goes on in varying degrees in many other countries.

³William W. Kaufman, The McNamara Strategy, pp. 3-5.

⁴Basil H. Liddell Hart, "The Defense of West Germany and the Baltic," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 48, Feb. 1964, p. 22.

Some Communist nations apparently see their world task as akin to the barbarian hordes that overcame ancient Rome. Yet they utilize (or are developing for use) the most modern techniques of air and sea transport as well as revolution control and support including the more primitive techniques of murder, kidnapping and terror. Despite such obstacles US global strategy must move onward toward its goals.

US REGIONAL STRATEGY

The United States occupies an international position of strength and moderation amid Communist imperialism, amid the dying embers of colonialism and amid tumultuous international activities of many new nations who are in need of many material and spiritual things. Among these needs are institutions and skills to guide their national destinies and food to nourish their run-away populations. All are part of the open, Free World society. The great task of the US and her more allied affluent friends (who share benefits of freedom) is to assist these new members in reaching a more stable, responsible and comfortable posture as soon as possible. This undertaking will require many decades of the most skillful, concerted and widespread effort and patience.

For some of the nations their greatest dilemma is a growing populace who do not desire betterment. For some nations, bridges and roads are needed acutely. Bridges, roads, harbors and air-fields are being built under enemy fire in Vietnam by Allied engineers. Greater regional bridges must be built--sea and air

communications, national and international legal, social and economic institutions and infrastructure and "bridges of understanding," all under continuing fire of Communist conspiracies.

There are five regions within which this strategy must continue to be exerted (a task that may never be completed to an optimum degree):

North Atlantic Community

Latin America

Middle East

Asia

Africa

Within each of these regions, certain nations are of such extreme importance to the freedom, stability and growth of the region and to international stability that no price is too high to pay in assistance. In Asia, the Republic of Vietnam is one such nation.

US strategy in Europe has facilitated development of institutions and infrastructures whereby viable nations are developing significant strengths. These strengths are vital to further regional viability of the North Atlantic Community. The European civil and military infrastructure together with US military forces were vital elements in the initial and continuing growth of the region. The urgently developing military and civil infrastructure in South East Asia--sea and air ports, highways, etc.⁵--are

⁵"Thailand," Time, Vol. 86, 24 Dec. 1965, p. 21.

essential in winning the war there as well as being essential to bringing true peace. But more importantly, military and civil infrastructure is not only needed in Asia and Europe, it is needed in the other key world regions: Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. This infrastructure is important to regional civil military viability and security. This is the foundation upon which longer term building of political, economic and psychosocial regional institutions will rely. These increasingly coherent world regions must continue to be the long term goal of improved strategic planning of the United States. Such long term steadiness of purpose is needed to help various nations contribute to this viability while overcoming their unique individual dilemmas.

IMPROVED KNOWLEDGE, STRATEGY, AND EFFORT

As in the past the United States will pragmatically continue to achieve success in these efforts. Better strategic planning can make more effective the vast efforts expended. Better strategies will produce better programs.

However, just as it is wrong to expect the logistician to produce his own strategy, it seems wrong to expect the strategists to develop, entirely, a comprehensive view of the contemporary world including its future. Traditionally, the collective purpose of academic institutions and universities has been to help define the contemporary world--this should continue to be so.

In an essay, "Machiavelli," Macaulay in the last century stated that the experienced man is the one who best realizes that maxims⁶ and slogans often have little practical value even when these slogans are not erroneous. Macaulay pointed out both the error and the truth in Machiavelli's slogans.

It is time to put aside the slogans of Machiavelli and Clausewitz, realizing the harm that these ambiguities have brought to many generations. Nevertheless, the central purpose underlying their writings and maxims should be retained--that it is vital to rise above the conceptual difficulties of an era and to form a sound perception or concept of war and struggles of that era.⁷ Their efforts to do this provided both the basis of modern, imperfect statecraft and warfare and frequently a too-literal application of many of their slogans.

War, today, is much broader in scope; it consists now of whole new families of esoteric and global conflicts. It would seem beyond the scope of any one man to form a sound concept of this contemporary world. It would have been beyond the scope of a Machiavelli or a Clausewitz or a Mahan. It is even debatable that they succeeded in their more narrow scope endeavors. Certainly Marx and Engels tried to form such a concept--but they failed dramatically; yet the world is still saddled with the

⁶Thomas B. Macaulay, "Machiavelli," Harvard Classics, Vol. 27, ed. by Charles W. Elliot, pp. 395-396.

⁷Felix Gilbert, "Machiavelli," The Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. by Edward M. Earle, p. 25.

"global slavery" extensions of their specious theories, the continuing existence of which is a monument to mankind's faulty perception and illusory action. Limitless harmful illusions will continue to abound in Communist and Free World affairs until the initial efforts of Machiavelli or Clausewitz at clearly identifying means and ends consistent with a clear view of the era are carried forward into the present day policy formulations.⁸ This then is an intellectual problem which is now becoming an increasingly common problem to educators and strategists alike.

There is some recognition today among academicians that more should be done by educational institutions in more effectively keeping pace with the so-called real world, in clarifying the contemporary scene. The crux of the problem is being recognized: that a number of American colleges have failed to keep abreast of changing times.⁹

Indeed, there are now some signs to indicate that the academic world seeks to strengthen its traditional role of bringing greater order to contemporary knowledge and affairs.¹⁰ This was the goal and aim of the great teachers of ancient Greece and Rome and of the great universities of the Middle Ages--Oxford, Cambridge,

⁸Peter Paret, "On Clausewitz," Military Review, Vol. 45, Jul. 1965, p. 53.

⁹"College Status Under Attack," The Evening Sentinel (Carlisle, Pa.), 11 Jan. 1966, p. 4.

¹⁰"What (If Anything) to Expect from Today's Philosophers," Time, Vol. 87, 7 Jan. 1966, pp. 24-25.

Paris, Salamanca, Bologna, Cracow, Prague--and the more recent great universities.

The individual student was encouraged to develop and challenged by a range of possible future real world achievement possibilities. A sense of intellectual order and a sense of responsibility in life were inbred from which individual creativeness could derive. A realization came early in university life that major aspects of life are highly organized and must be planned, must be kept going by people who understand long range planning. From every generation of this academic world (and despite the literate being the minority in the modern world until about 1870) there came numbers of "distinguished contributors to the order that lies beneath human affairs."¹¹ Order is of course the essential ingredient of stable civilized life and growth--the opposite is chaos.

This role of the university in the orderly future development of the individual is akin to the role that Free World strategy might have in the orderly and rational longer range development of nations. This role is contrary to communism's traditional wild destruction.

Academicians have indeed provided invaluable advisory services to the Federal Government on many immensely important short term technical and military policy and national security

¹¹Gilbert Highet, The Art of Teaching, pp. 151-159.

matters (on both an individual basis or as members of various research foundations). This should continue but waste¹² of effort can be reduced.

The presently improved US conventional posture was initiated by academicians¹³ and others have raised questions which have stimulated additional searching policy inquiries. Broad though these efforts may be, they are still confined essentially to a rather narrow portion of the spectrum of human knowledge which academia has traditionally encompassed and which becomes much more relevant in the present intensifying total and protracted conflict. There are gaps and weak spots in this knowledge spectrum which are known. But these lacunae affect the total strategy formulation and implementation.

As the academic world achieves greater effectiveness in defining criteria of order for the contemporary world (the traditional role of great universities and great scholars),¹⁴ the more specific work of the strategist in also bringing order will be less difficult. Such a role of using knowledge in bringing international order was stated by Elihu Root in 1922.¹⁵ Meantime, US military power will continue to be relied on as the primary source

¹²Henry Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, pp. 348-353.

¹³Duncan S. Ballantine and others, "Strategy of Defense," Letter to Editor, New York Times, 30 Apr. 1950, p. 8E.

¹⁴Ralph Waldo Emerson, "The American Scholar," Harvard Classics, ed. by Charles F. Elliot, Vol. 5, pp. 16, 22.

¹⁵Elihu Root, "A Requisite for Success in Popular Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, 15 Sep. 1922.

of US and Free World security in a world continually destabilized by communism's deceptive and protracted conflict. Meantime, man's traditional rationalism may not be sufficiently exerted to master the many revolutions of the era.

Unless future collective Free World effort proves to be more generally strategically perceptive and resolute than in the past, the struggle to preserve international order and progress might logically become more severe.

Finally, the importance to the Free World security of the US War Colleges (and similar institutions) can be glimpsed. Here global strategic problems are addressed directly, comprehensively and in depth. Strategic knowledge is developed and refined--a knowledge which considers all of the strategic instrumentalities and international institutions.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

CONCLUSIONS

An orderly, evolving Free World is essential to United States' survival and growth. The strategy which best facilitates this is needed.

Of primary importance is the current character of the Free World's role in deterring, transforming, or destroying those influences which would prevent realization of an orderly, evolving world. A strong and relevant military program is, therefore, vital. Complementary political, economic and other instrumentalities are needed, too.

Fundamentally, civilized institutions have evolved in the past from impetus provided by man's heritage of wisdom as gathered, developed, and propagated by great teachers and educational institutions. Therefore, civilization, order, reform, and evolution of progress are ultimately intellectual and institutional problems. There is no question but that resolution of such problems is increasingly needed. The best efforts of all political or governmental institutions are needed to supplement the universities in this function. However, all form a vital whole.

It is unlikely that fundamental national institutional problems can be solved entirely for any one nation by another nation due to profound cultural differences. But with common

purpose nations can assist each other by exchanging specialized knowledge and skills, and other resources. An orderly and evolving free world community must therefore depend to some degree upon educational institutions and universities throughout the world which facilitate understanding the present and looking into the future. To the extent this occurs more specific strategies can be provided with which to develop most meaningful national and international programs.

Strategy should give broad (but clear) guidelines in many areas of national endeavor including shaping the national military program. Regardless of all else that US National Strategy might wish to do, it must and will at least continue to shape a military means that provides adequate security to the United States in its open society setting of order, stability and growth. The United States and Allies must continue to mete out stern military punishment to those deceptive aggressors who would cast off those restraints implicit in an orderly, evolving world.

The United States security in the decades ahead lies in its eventual ability to either terminate, weaken, or withstand these massive global twilight aggressions. US military striking force and support strength in all these regions must by its existence deter and by its use, compel. Regardless of the obscurity of the instrumentalities employed by Communist wrecking tactics, the US military instrumentality must maintain a constant relevance so as to be able to act quickly and decisively in these ambiguous situations.

The national military program, the military instrumentality, can be shaped to do this if it is regarded as an integral part of the body of farsighted national strategy--a body which also includes adequate political, economic, psycho-social and other instrumentalities. The different relevance and varying soundness of each instrumentality must be a factor in applying an approximate mix of them to each situation. For example, the long term economic and psycho-social relevance may not readily apply in an immediate crisis. Often, politico-military actions may be of more timely short term relevance. Yet, all elements of the crisis or enduring dilemma must eventually be dealt with through both short and long term tools.


The major current threat to regional viabilities comes from both multifaceted Communist imperialism--an outgrowth of long term dilemmas inherent within communism--as well as different national perspectives of the major evolutionary forces of the present era.

This thesis identifies conceptual difficulties which must be overcome. These difficulties must be overcome to provide the improved strategic planning needed in developing viable world regions, including moderating communism. The United States and allies must continue to combine efforts in discovering clearer common purposes and programs, a great task for many generations to come.

Finally, one can only conclude that practicality demands that Free World strategies focus on those instrumentalities where uncertainties are fewest, continuing efforts to resolve uncertainties in the use of the other vital instrumentalities.

RECOMMENDATION

It is readily apparent that certain broad things must be done. First, the US must continue the character of its present, highly practical strategic world role to the extent resources permit. Second, the oversea strength and effectiveness of this role must be improved through improved US and Allied strategic planning armed with knowledge which eliminates or reduces the various conceptual difficulties identified in this thesis. Continued efforts must be directed to more clearly pinpoint conceptual difficulties, overcome them and obtain refinements of methods and techniques for resolving the traditional ambiguities which stand in the way of clarifying common international purposes and programs. Knowledge, traditionally, is obtained by asking questions, by piecing together fragments of knowledge. In questions of broadest human significance, this task has been the perennial role of universities and of representative government. To this task, Free World institutions, including the War Colleges of the United States, are being called on to add their increasingly vital intellectual efforts.


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Commander, USN

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